Bull Moose versus Weak Horse
The Founders and T.R. got it. Carter and Biden didn't. Trump might.
THE HOSTAGE LATITUDES (1789-2025)
For 236 years, U.S. presidents have grappled with ransom demands for Americans held hostage on or near the 3,100-mile line stretching from Tangier to Tehran. A thousand years ago, the Jewish scholar Maimonides, a resident of Arab Spain and North Africa, laid down principles for discouraging hostage-takers. From the 1500s through the early 1800s, North African pirates seized ships from Christian nations, enslaving and ransoming over a million passengers and crew members. The British Navy offered Colonial Americans some protection, but that ended with independence. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison understood the dangers of acquiescing to piracy. Defiance reached its zenith in a terse phrase uttered by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. Recent presidents—notably Jimmy Carter and, even worse, Joe Biden—failed to grasp the principles that evolved from the Founders to T.R. Post-election pronouncements by Donald Trump suggest a return to Rooseveltian principles—but time will tell whether that happens.
THE FOUNDERS’ DETERMINATION
The Founders understood that Americans’ wealth and well-being depends upon international trade, which requires that Americans be free to travel relatively unfettered around the globe. They also understood that the best way to avoid war is to make the prospect harrowingly unattractive to prospective enemies. Months before dying, Washington wrote:
“It is unfortunate when men cannot, or will not, see danger at a distance; or seeing it, are restrained in the means which are necessary to avert, or keep it afar off. … no problem in Euclid is more evident, or susceptible of clearer demonstration—Not less difficult is it to make them believe, that offensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only (in some cases) means of defence.”
In 1785, four years before Washington’s presidency, the Regency of Algiers declared war on the U.S., and the fledgling nation began the humiliating practice of paying annual tribute (e.g., protection money) to the Dey (ruler) to guarantee safe passage for Americans. Consider the following steps from Washington to Teddy Roosevelt:
GEORGE WASHINGTON agreed in 1795 to continue paying tribute to the Dey, because his fledgling military had no capacity to respond to distant threats. But Congress and Washington established the U.S. Navy to free future presidents from this protection racket. The new Navy would “protect our commerce and chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships and vessels wherever you shall find them.” In 1798, speaking of French threats, South Carolina Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper uttered a toast that soon became associated with America’s struggles against the Barbary pirates of North Africa: “Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute.”
THOMAS JEFFERSON refused to pay tribute to the Pasha of Tripoli. While instinctively fearful of foreign entanglements, Jefferson launched the First Barbary War in 1801, culminating in 1805 with the legendary dispatch of Marines “to the shores of Tripoli.” The Pasha released his hostages and ended demands for tribute.
JAMES MADISON launched the Second Barbary War in 1815 to end resurgent piracy. Congress declared war in March, and the Dey sued for peace in June, after naval bombardment and a threat to seize Algiers. After the Dey abrogated the treaty in 1816, European and American forces smashed his will and ended Mediterranean piracy.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT uttered the most succinct refusal to tolerate hostage-taking. After the Moroccan brigand, Raisuni (a.k.a. Raisuli), kidnapped Greek-American Ion Perdicaris in 1904, Roosevelt warned Morocco’s Sultan, “This government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuni dead” and sent ships steaming toward Tangier to buttress his message. The Sultan forced Raisuni to release Perdicaris and his British son-in-law almost immediately.
ROOSEVELT’S EXHORTATION
In 1912, Roosevelt would compare himself to a bull moose. In 1904, his five words—“Perdicaris alive or Raisuni dead”—suggested nine qualities for a successful response to hostage-takers:
SWIFT: Raisuni kidnapped Perdicaris and his son-in-law on May 18, 1904. In under a week, warships arrived. Perdicaris was home by June 24.
CLEAR: Roosevelt’s statement was crystalline and unambiguous. Raisuni and the Sultan knew the options. The American public knew the names and faces of Perdicaris and Raisuni.
RELENTLESS: Roosevelt allowed Raisuni and the Sultan no rest from America’s threats.
FOCUSED: Roosevelt didn’t try to fix Morocco’s other problems or free hostages from other nations. He sought Perdicaris’s release and offered Raisuni death as his only other option.
NONCHALANT: Roosevelt offered two outcomes, and left the choice to Raisuni—either of which would satisfy T.R. He gave the impression of not losing sleep over the affair and turned his attention to other matters while the U.S. military hounded Raisuni.
COORDINATED: The president and his underlings had internal arguments, but in public, they spoke as one.
TERRIFYING: T.R. sent a clear message. Perdicaris would return home safely, or Raisuni would die horribly and the Sultan would suffer humiliation in a part of the world that does not tolerate those who have been humiliated.
PROPHYLACTIC: Roosevelt’s principal aim was dissuading future hostage-taking, with Perdicaris’s freedom a secondary goal. Roosevelt learned that Perdicaris had given up his American citizenship, leading some to argue that America had no obligation to free him. But what mattered to Roosevelt was that Raisuni thought Perdicaris was American. Raisuni, the Sultan, and the rest of the Arab world needed a clear, convincing indicator that one had better not kidnap Americans—and Perdicaris’s legal status was irrelevant.
WESTPHALIAN: Roosevelt placed the ultimate burden of resolution upon the Sultan of Morocco, who had no role in the kidnapping. The 1648 Treaties of Westphalia gave sovereigns the authority and the obligation to constrain non-state actors like Raisuni. Roosevelt sharply reminded the Sultan of that obligation.
CARTER’S HUMILIATION
When Iranian “students” seized 53 American hostages in November 1979, Jimmy Carter was oblivious to much of what Teddy Roosevelt knew. Chess may have originated in Iran, and the name “tic-tac-toe” originated in the U.S.—thus providing an apt metaphor for Khomeini versus Carter. Three months after his infamous “malaise” speech, Carter responded to Iran with enfeebled malaise.
Carter somewhat grasped the first four principles listed above. He responded quickly, he expressed moral outrage, his goals were clear, and his efforts were limited. But Carter’s focus was exclusively on the short-term goal of retrieving these particular hostages, rather than Roosevelt’s long-term focus on discouraging future hostage-taking.
Carter failed spectacularly on the other five principles. With the return of hostages as the only option and with no reason to fear military action, Carter absolved the “students” and Ayatollahs of the excruciating choices that Raisuni and the Sultan faced. Carter promised to remain in the White House till the situation was resolved, thereby making himself the 54th hostage. His aides feuded publicly—notably National Security Advisor Zbiginiew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. On November 6, 1979, he sent Iran a groveling letter that began, “Dear Ayatollah Khomeini”—essentially relieving the government of its Westphalian obligations from the outset. Carter’s only military action was a doomed-in-advance rescue mission that ended in cinema-worthy disaster, after which he issued an obsequious quasi-apology:
“The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.”
The day the hostages were taken in 1979, Carter should have given the Ayatollahs an ultimatum: “Hostages free by Wednesday or Iran's military obliterated by Sunday.” The mullahs would likely have buckled. The hostages would have been returned in a week, rather than in 14 months. Given Iran’s honor/shame ethos, Iranians would almost certainly have overthrown the government and perhaps hanged the Ayatollahs from the construction cranes that they’ve used for gay people and dissidents ever since. Iran would have been in no position to construct and fortify Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Iraqi and Syrian regimes over the next 45 years.
Decades later, Osama bin Laden famously said: “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse.” Carter, the weak horse, bridled for fourteen months, and Iran did not free the hostages till fifteen minutes after he was deposed by Ronald Reagan, whom the Iranians saw as a strong horse.
BIDEN’S ABDICATION
Forty-four years later, Joe Biden’s virtual non-response to Hamas’s kidnapping of more than half a dozen American citizens has been far worse than Carter’s earnest flailing. (Hamas—one of many legacies of Carter’s failure in Iran—also brutally murdered another four dozen Americans on October 7.) Biden was chronically slow to respond, and unclear in his demands / requests / polite suggestions to Hamas. His mention of American hostages has been intermittent and impersonal.
In 1904, every American could name Perdicaris; how many today can name a single American Hamas hostage or murder victim? How many Americans today can recall a single quote from Biden on the subject? He largely outsourced the safety of American hostages to Israel, and then repeatedly interfered with Israel’s prosecution of that effort. His most visible efforts have been incompetent efforts to send aid to Gazans via the kidnappers themselves. The most photogenic example was the vastly expensive floating pier that predictably broke apart at the first sign of choppy seas on the Mediterranean. In 14 months, he has given Hamas no reason to think twice about taking more American hostages, should the opportunity arise again. Indeed, on Biden’s watch, the world’s most powerful military has sat sleepy-eyed and helpless as piracy by the Houthis (another Iranian proxy) has disrupted world trade in earth’s most critical shipping lanes.
A proper response by an American president after October 7 would have been something along the lines of:
“This government wants Alexander, Chen, Dekel-Chen, Haggai, Weinstein Haggai, Neutra, and Siegel alive, or Hamas dead. In time, justice will be delivered for the four dozen Americans murdered this week. But if those seven Americans are not released by this coming Thursday, justice will will be delivered swiftly and brutally with the full force of the American military.”
TRUMP’S FULMINATION
Like Jimmy Carter forty-four years earlier, Joe Biden leaves office after more than a year without progress on American citizens held hostage—this time in far more barbaric conditions than was true in Iran. As with Carter, there is talk in the air of a deal to free the hostages just as Biden meanders away from the White House. One need not like or respect Donald Trump to suspect that these latest developments have little to do with Biden and much to do with the fact that he will soon be replaced by a president openly declaring that he will, in effect, be the strong horse to Biden’s self-gelded glue-factory horse.
In a social media post on December 2, Trump gave the impression of navigating back toward a T.R.-like stance:
“If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025 … there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity. … Those responsible will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America. RELEASE THE HOSTAGES NOW!”
Only time will tell whether this is a genuine shift in policy or transient bluster. It’s not as eloquent or succinct as “Perdicaris alive or Raisuni dead.” But it suggests that the plaintive social media hashtag #BringThemHome may soon give way to a more piercing #SendThemHomeOrElse. Or, even more parsimoniously—#FAFO. We’ll soon see.
THE WIND AND THE LION
In its time (1975), Director John Milius’s The Wind and the Lion was a fine film but an exceedingly loose historical treatment of the Perdicaris Affair. In the film, Ion Perdicaris, a middle-aged male, becomes “Eden Pedecaris” (Candice Bergen), a glamorous young woman. A key plot point is a battle between U.S. Marines and German troops. In truth, only a few Marines entered Morocco (to protect Mrs. Perdicaris), and there were no German troops anywhere. As writer/director John Milius said:
“No one wanted to make a movie about Arabs and Teddy Roosevelt. So we had to make concessions: a more romantic male, a beautiful woman, much more box office that way.”
In the clip above, Teddy Roosevelt (Brian Keith) utters the cinematic version of TR’s famous quote (“Pedecaris alive, or Raisuli dead.”) to Secretary of State John Hay (John Huston).
"It is unfortunate when men cannot, or will not, see danger at a distance; or seeing it, are restrained in the means which are necessary to avert, or keep it afar off."
I may make a plaque with the above inscribed. The applications are limitless:
The current tragedy in CA is Exhibit A. Similarly, whenever markets are in turmoil, the signs were always there well before the downdraft. The list goes on.
I truly enjoy the educational experience from your posts. Always informative and enlightening.
Thank you for this! I have been blowing this trumpet, specifically about the Red Sea humiliation, for months. The American hostages held by Hamas are Pedecaris all over again. I think the current hosannas for the Biden cease fire deal may very well be a last gasp effort by the Biden administration to contractually bind both Israel and the US to its (Biden's) vision of a two-state, stop killing off Hamas, implicitly blame Israel for it all, policies. Retired Navy intelligence officer J.E. Dyer points out here that Trump has never supported the cease fire – hostages released Yes!... ceasefire not his agenda. She notes that the hell he would release would be provided by Israel. The current effort with the cheer leading from the media and other pro-Palestinian on-lookers, has all the earmarks of a, dare I say, disinformation campaign? Link to her piece below:
https://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2025/01/14/thinking-aid-trumps-warning-to-hamas-is-about-hostages-not-a-ceasefire/
I am taking the liberty of repeating below what I wrote exactly one year ago... January 2024:
The administration is drawing lines again – this time in the Red Sea. We are warning the Houthis – don’t do that – thus affirming that what they are doing is working. That'll do it – just look how well it has deterred them in the past. Admiral James Stavridis has a good piece on gcaptain.com discussing four actions he suggests, in summary here, in his words:
(link here: https://gcaptain.com/stavridis-hit-the-houthis-iran-red-sea/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-a6a902de22-170552099&mc_cid=a6a902de22&mc_eid=859186b276)
First, US rules of engagement need to be modified to permit offensive action against verified Houthi targets at sea.
A good second step would be strikes ashore at known Houthi infrastructure.
Third, if the Houthis do not cease their operations after proportional attacks against their maritime assets, we may need to up the ante by striking more broadly at their military capability.
A fourth, and highly controversial, level of escalation would be to attack Iranian assets directly.
But then he diminishes his argument by tossing in this: "Any campaign against Iran would need to be a carefully calibrated series of escalating attacks, with built-in pauses allowing Tehran to stop the Houthi piracy." Carefully calibrated escalation with scheduled pauses to induce the foe to moderate conduct has been the bane of every conflict we have engaged in from Vietnam to Afghanistan, to current situations in Iraq and the Red Sea. Do we never learn? Reinstitute the time-tested concept of punitive expeditions ... exact severe consequences and go home, with the explicit understanding that there is more where that came from if you do it again.
Per Stavridis recommendations 1 & 2, there should be smoking holes wherever there is a Houthi launcher, support facility, command center, supply hub – you get the idea. Houthi forces afloat? Sink them on sight. Iran supplying targeting information via a ship in the Red Sea? Sink it – OK warn them to remove it or lose it, but if they don’t – sink it. The Iranian frigate now in the Red Sea? Same thing – send her home or we send her to the bottom. No occupation, no gradual escalation, no pause for reflection, no wringing of hands about international comity, no inducements to join in the brotherhood of nations ... f**k with us and pay a price. Do what you must within your country – do not harm ours, or our national interests or those of the free world. "This Government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead."