What can I say Robert? Beautifully written! I disagree with every syllable! Except for when you referenced Sharon as supporting Jordan is Palestinian, which it is, 75-85% of it, regardless of the Bedouin "king" that runs it. But even then, the Palestinians as they present themselves to this day are not interested in Jordan or the West Bank. They want Tel Aviv and Haifa and Jerusalem, and they never stop saying that openly and empathetically. It is too late for two states west of the Jordan river. There is Israel and there is Jordan. That's it.
Thanks Ehud. I appreciate both the compliment and the criticism--exactly the sort of conversation I'm looking for. My piece specifically brushes off the notion of near-term friendship and speaks only of a "cold peace," enforced by cooler heads outside of any future Palestine. Much of what you say is true, but Israel faces facts on the ground, as always. "Palestinian-movers" will be no more successful than "Jew-Movers"--and the rest of the world would impose a terrible price on Israel for any such attempt. Jordan has made clear for 56 years that they have no intention of resuming control over the West Bank, and Egypt has similarly refused all pleas for it to resume control over Gaza. Yes, Palestinians want Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa, but I'm not sure they want them any more than Assad wants them. The difference is that if Assad attempts to act upon his desires, or if he allows terrorists in his territory to do so, he is subject to heavy bombardment by the Israeli Army and Air Force. I'll also note that Egypt and Jordan were once as irredentist with respect to Israeli territory as the Palestinians are today. Now, they are at least civil toward Israel, and that change did not come from introspection, but rather from the certainty that Israeli had the right and the power to pulverize them if they acted badly. Those options are open to Israel if dealing with a state, but they're not possible with the status quo. My thesis is based not on optimism per se, but rather on steely pessimism--seeking a potentially less awful situation than the status quo. Again, I deeply appreciate your comments.
Your thesis is consistent. It also commendably tries to map out a solution. I see what you mean about steely pessimism, and it is apparent in your effort here, but at the same time I think that the over-all picture that you are painting is wildly optimistic and unachievable. And undesirable for the Jewish state. This thesis deserves a serious response. I need more time to digest this. Suggestion: would you be interested in a substack-based correspondence on this piece? Meaning I would write a post in response to this one of yours and we take it from there to see where it goes. At a leisurely pace so as not to interfere with our regular schedules. Or we could just continue the conversation here in the comments. What do you think?
I don't disagree. But a cold peace with Hamas dead and Saudi Arabia holding Palestinians' feet to the fire might be a very different cold peace. When Jordan ruled the West Bank and Egypt ruled Gaza, they had no external threat to inspire good behavior. Nor did Egypt or Jordan have the financial wherewithal to bribe/threaten the Palestinians into good behavior, even if they had wished to. I am hoping (not predicting) that fear of Iran and the precedents already laid down by the UAE and Bahrain (and to a lesser extent by Oman) might encourage Saudi Arabia to impose a Pax Saudia upon the recalcitrant Palestinians. Again, a hope, not a prediction. Particularly if Israel greatly reduces the economic ties with the West Bank that have long given Abbas the capacity to tolerate or provoke trouble. Again, a hope, not a prediction. And, again, not an ideal situation--merely the best of a bad lot of choices.
FWIW, I'm enjoying your many contributions immensely. Your skepticism is logical, and well-stated. Given that, where do you imagine things will go in the next 20 years with respect to the conflict? Any resolution that you can imagine? Continued status quo?
I expect no big changes in the character of regimes or peoples. In science, and I think in life, the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, properly understood.
Does that mean no hope for peace in the Middle East? Not quite. If Israel is permitted to win the war, afterwards the Netanyahu project may resume and succeed: to normalize relations with the Arab nations and thereby essentially end the Arab-Israeli Wars. That would leave the Palestinian terrorist groups stranded like those Japanese soldiers on far-flung Pacific islands who didn’t know the war was over.
Does that mean a chance for peace in the Middle East? No, only for a less unfavorable posture when Iran brings war.
I’m not so sure they want Tel Aviv and Haifa and Jerusalem. Look how those were neglected before the Jews arrived! No, what they appear to want is to kill all the Jews.
Correction: before the Jews arrived in large numbers in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Of course there were already some Jews from time immemorial.
I think you are correct. But I think Robert has a point when he is talking about "moving Jews." Theoretically, if all the Jews were "removed" from Israel, the Arabs would be content. Nothing less than that though.
Perhaps so, but in the event that all the Jews were “removed” from Israel, it is very possible that not only Hamas but the Palestinian Arab people would be liquidated, very much as the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) was after the North Vietnamese victory—and for the same reasons.
Not entirely. (Later edit: possible confusion of pronoun’s antecedent. Tel Aviv was sand dunes; Zion as a whole was not entirely that.) And the Jewish pioneers were able to make something of it. In fact, it’s the greatest success story in the Third World.
I beg your pardon. I dispute not only the existence, but the possibility, of an architectural masterpiece of the Bauhaus School, for reasons substantially set out in Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House (1981).
Yeah ... I love that book, and I generally agree with Wolfe's thesis. But one can have an unpleasant masterpiece. My wife, son, and I always thought that Frank Lloyd Wright's houses were quite stunning, and we visited many of them across the country. With one exception, however, we thought they were all unlivable. Claustrophobic, inflexible layouts, materials that fell apart over time. But as works of art, they were quite beautiful--Fallingwater being the preeminent example of a masterpiece of imagery, but an awful interior space for living. Tel Aviv is something like that. Sort of the glimmering futuristic-looking city out of sci-fi. Of course, seeing it as I did, 60-70 years after it was built, the concrete surfaces were chipped and mildewed.
Correct. It's often forgotten that Faisal, King of Greater Syria after WWI, was sort of OK with the Balfour Declaration, made some moves toward welcoming Jews to Palestine as a way of spurring its pathetic economy, and signed an agreement with Chaim Weizmann--later the first president of Israel. There's longstanding debate over whether Faisal was sincere in signing the agreement or whether it was a subterfuge to give him leverage against the European mandatory authorities. But initially, he gave the appearance of welcoming the immigration of Jews to Palestine. Similarly, King Abdullah I of Jordan was initially open to a Jewish political entity in Palestine, though he seems to have insisted that it be a protectorate of Jordan, rather than an independent Jewish state. Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951, in part because he was secretly meeting with Israeli officials about potential agreements. His assassin was related to the Grand Mufti, of course.
I have to agree with Ehud Neor's comment here. 10/7 proved pretty emphatically that the "Palestinians" cannot be appeased. Their leaders have said publicly, multiple times since then, that 10/7 was only a rehearsal. *Take them at their word!*
You call Sharon's withdrawal a "Nixon-to-China" moment. This seems apt: a leader doing something no one expected, that everyone around him had good reason to oppose, which years later proved to be an utter disaster that should never have happened. This wasn't needed to demonstrate that appeasement of an armed, hostile adversary is a bad idea; we have millennia of human history to prove that beyond any reasonable doubt.
Thanks, Bob. I appreciate your comments and respect your logic. See what I've said to Ehud. As I noted at the start of my piece, I'm asking a question, not providing any definitive answer. I have no delusions about good intentions on the part of Abbas or his cohort. The status quo has festered for 56 years--without improvement--and I feel quite confident that it cannot fester another 56 years. (If I'm wrong, I will do my best to issue an erratum in 2079.) The question I ask is which institutional structure is least awful. I offer these thoughts with humility and understanding that there are good arguments to the contrary. But I think the conversation is worth having, as I am not optimistic about the current dynamic. As for Sharon, I suspect his action could have worked, but the post-Sharon policies obliterated the logic. The heavy cross-border traffic and provision of utilities may have been the real Dane-geld--and I wonder how different things might have been had Israel said, "You want us out? We're out. Go build some power plants. Build some water treatment facilities. Build some industries. Raise some crops. Good luck."
Yeah, sometimes I wonder if societal quarantine isn't the best (or at least the least-bad) solution. Wall them off, no one in or out by land, air, or sea, for any reason. No, not even that reason. Or that one. Check back in on them once every 50 years or so to see if they've learned to behave like a civilized society yet. No? OK. See you in another half-century. Bye.
I wouldn't advocate that, but I suspect you're being deliberately hyperbolic. Had the Gazans daily meals, clothes, water, healthcare, and electricity depended upon their own efforts, rather than Israel's largesse, I'm not sure Hamas's reign would have been sustainable for 17 years. The biggest potential hole in my conjecture is that the UN and NGOs might have plied them with enough aid to keep Hamas's racket going.
> Had the Gazans daily meals, clothes, water, healthcare, and electricity depended upon their own efforts, rather than Israel's largesse, I'm not sure Hamas's reign would have been sustainable for 17 years. The biggest potential hole in my conjecture is that the UN and NGOs might have plied them with enough aid to keep Hamas's racket going.
Exactly. When the Israelis were able to grow prosperous on that land, with no outside help, it proves that it is possible. If other people are unable to do the same... there are really only so many viable explanations. Take away the excuses, and what's left is the truth, undeniable as a naked Emperor, plan for all to see whether they wish to acknowledge it or not.
And were anyone were to try what my essay suggests, an economic divorce without alimony) might well be an essential element. Again, I mentioned that the Saudis would have to wield carrots and sticks.
My modest two cents since October 8 have been what you advocate: all supplies of everything from Israel stop forever. Need food? Grow or trade for it like the rest of the world. No electricity? Need power? Buy fuel. etc. etc.
Israel, in its upcoming occupation, should be directing Gaza workers to do that, to build. A lot. Roads, power plants, water treatment and desalination, raising crops.
I hesitate to weigh in on this as I lack the credentials and experience to do so except from a mental health perspective. I was raised Catholic by a devout mother and an equally devout Presbyterian father (who had to agree to the children being raised as Catholic or no marriage) then boarding schooled at an Episcopal school for 4 years. I found hypocrisy, racism, sexism and intolerance in all of them. My son in law, my best friends from medical school and residency, my bridge partner and my friend, the author of this outstanding blog, are Jewish and I only say this to observe that the only differences I see in people relate to the things they are taught at an early age. It’s hard to shake off the fervent dogma that is imposed upon us when we are unable to exercise reason or judgment and it doesn’t get any easier as we age and tread on the path that was set for us. I wish that “process” was taught before “content. Even if an elderly man was wise enough to have a change of mind and/or heart, I’m afraid it would take more courage than either of these two have to bring about the sensible and entirely logical circumstances you describe. However, I admire your
Sorry, I was editing and sent before finishing. My final thoughts: I wish that children were taught process before content, or, how to believe before what to believe, but it does no good to whine about it now. My premise is that I am more optimistic that younger players will be more able to alter the dynamics because they haven’t tread the path as far as the current leaders. I wish it were possible and that your bright ideas are present in the minds of those who have a seat at the table and that they have the ego strength to be wise when it conflicts with their identities. Thanks again for edifying and making me think deeply.
The problem isn’t one of leaders. If deprived of Hamas, the Gazans will find another just like it: because killing all the Jews is the most popular policy with that demographic.
… not as a means to, but instead of having a state of their own, which is what Westerners want them to want.
Thanks. There's a problem here, and it stems from what you yourself say ("It’s hard to shake off the fervent dogma that is imposed upon us when we are unable to exercise reason or judgment and it doesn’t get any easier as we age..."). All the children of Gaza--all of them--have been raised from birth in schools whose curriculum focuses on the beauty of killing Jews. Mundane arithmetic problems in their textbooks have the children count Jews killed, rather than apples and bananas. Those in charge offer great rewards for those who participate in the process of killing Jews. Israeli education is the antithesis--perhaps seen most stunningly in the Israeli medical system's heroic efforts to save the lives of injured Palestinian terrorists who have just murdered innocents on a bus or some such. But adults are capable of changing their minds. An upcoming column compares two histories--Hamas is an offshoot of an organization nurtured and financed by Nazi Germany with the express purpose of farming out the job of killing Jews in the Mideast. Hamas has made very clear since its establishment that that task is still central to its purpose and that there is essentially zero chance of their changing. My article will also describe another Hitler enthusiast who found a different path. That was Anwar Sadat--a great peacemaker who forged a genuine peace and friendship with the Israelis. He knew that path might cost him his life and, in the end, it did.
Anwar Sadat forged a genuine peace treaty with the Israelis. I am not persuaded that (beyond what was convenient to diplomacy) friendship entered into it. Nor need it have.
Of course it would be nice, but we Jews don’t need our neighbors to love us; we just need them not to attack us. In that respect we are like other people; but in other people this need is not considered outrageous.
The vast majority of commentators I've seen on this subject don't seem to have yet grasped that peace is dead in the Middle East. It's apparently too simple an insight for their sophisticated minds to consume.
History lessons, political analysis, blame game sermons, finger pointing victim claims etc all made a sort of sense when there was some hope they would lead to peace. If that hope is now gone, the kind of commentary that has dominated this subject for 75 years is now outdated, and no longer worth pursuing, as it's not going to accomplish anything.
The appropriate topic today is, how do we help the innocent get out of war zone?
Be very careful about suggesting that Israelis trust Fatah with their security. Why is Fatah not Hamas 2.0? Only because Abbas is old, rich, corrupt, and lazy. But—old!—he will soon be gone.
Indeed. I mention elsewhere that I don't trust Fatah one bit. I think there is a chance--and only a chance--that Saudi Arabia and certain other Arab nations may have both the power and the motive to rein in Fatah's worst impulses--a situation that did not exist previously. And it is not that I think an independent state run by Fatah would be good, but only that it might be less awful than the status quo.
Robert, you wrote a compelling and interesting thesis, but one I disagree with. First when Gaza was left to the Gazan’s in 2005 they were given the opportunity for independent governance by the PA. The first thing they did was destroy the infrastructure and businesses left for them, paid for by rich Americans. The next year Hamas was elected as their governing body. Hamas removed the PA with horrific violence. Why isn’t Hamas considered a State actor when they invade Israel? If they invaded Egypt they would be treated as a State actor. As for Abbas he is there because of the lesson learned in Gaza and there haven’t been any elections Judea and Samaria for the Arabs living there because Hamas would win. Given that some Arab terrorists are armed by Jordanian diplomats it isn’t hard to imagine more lethal weapons being transferred to the area west of the Jordan that originated in Iran. I think in the end your thesis fails because of Iran. Absent Iran there may be a way forward. Consider that the Houthi’s in Yemen are threatening free passage in the Red Sea after having fired on Saudi Arabia in the past all supported by Iran.
Some problems don’t have solutions. Not that are apparent at this time. As far as the treaty of Westphalia, that ended with NATO taking sides in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. The result is being felt in the Ukraine today.
Prior to 1993 the Arabs living in Judea and Samaria had the second highest standard of living in the Middle East, second only to the Saudis. The Oslo accords ended that because economics take second place to intifada. Maybe the end result of the latest round of fighting will yield new opportunities and new ideas. Until then the Israelis must prepare for war and pray for peace.
Thanks for the thoughtful query. Some mornings I agree with what you say, which is why I characterized my piece as more question than answer.
The key to my argument is that in our post-Westphalian world, statehood is well-defined and qualitatively different from any other institutional arrangement. I agree that the self-destruction and perpetual rain of missiles on Israel that followed the withdrawal from Gaza are appalling and deeply informative, they represent the behavior of nonstate actors, and not of a nation-state. After Israel’s departure, Gazans had “autonomous governance,” not “independent governance.” The Palestinians have observer status, not membership, at the United Nations. One reads about Palestinian “embassies” and “ambassadors,” rather than embassies and ambassadors—the quotation marks matter. Hamas lacks even this quasi-statal pretense. Hamas has, in fact, invaded Egyptian territory by tunnelling beneath it. Egypt responded by flooding tunnels, but their enemy was a shadowy consortium, not a government.
The query I pose here, is not whether this scheme would be good for Israel in the short- the medium-term, but, rather, whether it would be less awful for Israel than the alternatives. The alternatives I see are three: (1) Jordan, and/or Egypt resume control of the Palestinian territories; (2) Palestinians are relocated outside of Palestine; or (3) the status quo continues for additional decades. It has long been clear that neither (1) nor (2) is tenable, and the real heart of my query is whether October 7 can continue to be a viable option. My question is whether Palestinian independence, sired by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, and requiring mutual diplomatic recognition by Israel and Palestine is a less dangerous option going forward than (3).
As you suggest, Iran is the great unknown, but it may also be the glue that holds my whole idea together. Iran poses an existential threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, as well as to Israel. Arguably, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is distracting the Saudis and others from adequate response to the threats out of Yemen.
Right now, Israel monitors border controls, airspace, and sea access to the Palestinian territories. That is an enormous source of Palestinian resentment, but vital for Israel’s security, given the threat of Iranian weaponry coming in. For this reason, Israel is unlikely to agree to unsupervised Palestinian borders. I can, however, imagine Israel agreeing to turn that power over to a consortium of Arab nations which recognize Israel—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Sudan, UAE, and, presumably Saudi Arabia and others that sign on to a diplomatic resolution. Israel would not likely trust one nation (e.g., Jordan) because, as you suggest, that nation’s diplomats might facilitate the passage of Iranian weapons. But a multinational force might be acceptable, particular with a provision for Israeli observers.
Returning to the question of Westphalian nation-states, I’ll close with a cinematic reference. One aspect of the movie Casablanca always fascinated me. The entire premise of the film revolved around the idea that Nazi officials would respect letters of transit. The most barbaric regime in human history still felt obliged to respect the bureaucratic trappings of nationhood. And we have the actual cases of foreign diplomats like Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Carl Lutz, and Chiune Sugihara saving thousands of Jewish refugees by signing documents that the Nazis would not disrespect.
The question of my essay (question, not answer) is, in a post-October 7 world, which will be the more effective restraint on Palestinian behavior—the Israeli military or the ligatures borne by nation-states. I don’t pretend to know the answer, but I am confident that it is an open question.
I think the entire Oslo process was a a catastrophic mistake. Many argued at the time that any concessions made by Israel would be irreversable even if Arafat proved to be the terrorist/murderer he had always been. And so it proved to be. To this DAY, mandarins in our state department demand Israel allow a terror state on its border. There were alternatives. There were Palestinians who actually lived in the West Bank who might have been more interested in accepting a compromnise in return for a state but Rabin wanted Arafat who he stupidly thought would fight and destroy Hamas. We all know how that worked out. If Sharon knew that Hamas would be ruling Gaza in two years and making war on Israel for the next dozen he never would have done what he did. Once again an Israeli leader trusted the PLO to do what it never could or would do. Now we are here. From my standpoint the best thing Israel could actually do, since the US demands a solution, the rest of the world wants Israel to disappear in favor of a terror state and the PA has NO interest in accepting a state if it means ending the conflict to destroy Israel is as follows:
Israel should do what it WOULD do if the PA was actually interested in peace. Annex, those "settlements: (Which are actually cities) adjacent to Jerusalem where the vast majority of the "settlers" live. Annex any other land necessary for Israel's security on the assumption it will have a permanent bloodthirsty enemy on the border. Remove any settlements that fall outside this area. Declare a border and say negotiations are over. Any Palestinians on the Israeli side of the border can claim citizenship (After proper security vetting) by pledging loyalty to the state as Israel Arabs do. Any unwilling to do so can be placed on the other side of the border. Create a serious no mans land and declare that anyone entering it will be shot on sight. No Palestinian will be allowed to enter Israel ever. ALl borders will be shut tight. Declare that any hostile actions by the state of Palestine will bring major repurcussions. Declare any nation that arms Palestine or a terror group based in Palestine will be treated as having committed an act of war. Declare that Israel will refuse to cooperate with any international organization that seeks to aid Palestine in its war to destroy Israel. And then carry it out.
This is a terrible solution. But since the status quo is clearly no longer tenable it is the only thing that can be done when the Palestinians won't utilize diplomacy and act in good faith.
I think Bill Clinton came to a similar conclusion after Arafat stabbed him and Israel in the back. Yes, Rabin erred grievously in extending any trust whatsoever to Arafat. As for your second paragraph, with a few exceptions, it's not too different from what I suggested. Much of what you suggest is the natural order of things between two nations established under Westphalian Principles. As I've mentioned elsewhere, I would suggested that a treaty establishing independence specify that border control--including air and sea routes--would be overseen by a multinational outfit run by, say, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan (plus any later signatories to the Abraham Accords)--with Israeli observers. The Palestinians wouldn't like it, but it would considerably delegitimize the claim that occupation continues. Israel might be hesitant to entrust any one Arab nation with such a role, but the interests of those 7 countries are varied enough to make the idea worth considering.
Big difference. Sadat and Hussein had strategic reasons for doing it. Their nations entire national identity was not built around the destruction of Israel. I wouldn't say never but as the Palestinian populace has been thoroughly Nazified it would take decades of de Nazification before it would be remotely possible. That's what Oslo was supposed to provide, a Palestinian population educated to accept compromise. The exact opposite happened because the leaders of the Palestinian national movement are not Anwar Sadat
Hence, my suggestion in the piece and in various comments that the guarantor would have to be not the Palestinians, but rather the Saudis, perhaps in concert with other Arab nations that have a strong strategic interest in reining in the Palestinians' ill intentions. Oslo presumed goodwill from the Palestinian Authority. I suggest a process that presumes goodwill from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others with the power to restrain the Palestinians. And, frankly, Egypt under Nasser was pretty close to today's Palestinians in terms of Nazification.
Egypt still is close in terms of Nazification. The difference is that Sadat made a strategic decision in 1973 to leave the Soviet orbit and enter the American and to do that he had to make his peace with Israel. It was never popular and led to his murder. It wasn't especially popular in Jordan either which is why the King frequently sounds like Abu Mazen. The only country that I see where there has been a real shift is the UAE.
There will not be peace until Israel totally controls Gaza, with Hamas powerless tho preferably having surrendered.
Then Israel should declare a new state, tha Gaza Confederation (5 cantons), temporarily occupied by Israel and subject to Israeli martial law. NOT the PA corruption of West Bank, and instead the second of a 3 state solution.
Based on UN human rights, and on Swiss govt limits, with Singapore style enforcement of law, Israel can show the world how to create a new city state—while putting all Gazans to work on reconstruction. The 5 current Gaza admin districts should become cantons led by an Israeli, with a group of Gaza advisors.
Then Israel can remain Jewish, the West Bank remain PA controlled, and Gaza becomes an internationally open and secular society… full of Jew haters who must follow very humane laws and have jobs.
Maybe Gaza Palestine Confederation is a better, tho longer name.
Unfortunately, what you are discussing is fairly close to what existed 1967-2005. Gaza had one of the world's fastest-growing economies during those years. Literacy and other education metrics soared. Wasn't what they wanted.
My point is that Israel in victory over Hamas has the opportunity to declare the Gaza Confederation a separate country, separate from the West Bank.
Create a Swiss based constitution with changes, primarily those of Tel Aviv secular Jews wanting a non-Jewish legal system with no special Jewish, nor Muslim nor Christian nor atheist rights.
With honest occupation and martial law, NOT democracy, at first. Then each individual Gaza inhabitant becomes, automatically, a citizen of the Gaza Confederation. Then the Israeli occupiers take physical census of all 2.3 million, allowing ID and noting birthday & family info. And each adult signs an actual Social Contract, which includes Gaza & Israeli borders, and a promise to obey laws with a promise to renounce terrorism.
Never before tried, won’t work 100% for those who sign.
For those who don’t sign—they become Prisoners of War, and Gaza might have numerous POW camps. And allow UN & Red Cross visits. They will be freed when they surrender and sign up to be law abiding Gaza citizens.
Israeli police, judges, government supervisors with limited Gaza support of trusted locals.
Maybe a big bonus to Israeli Arabs willing to emigrate to Gaza, and keep dual citizenship & voting rights in Israel until Gaza elections start, in some future time.
During the prior pre-2005 occupation, Israel was trying to create a single second state, the 2 state solution, allowing lots of Jew hating Muslims veto powers. The Gaza Confederation is a 3 state solution. Jewish Israel, Muslim West Bank not yet a country with agreed to borders, and forced non-secular Gaza. Maybe not to be democratic for 16 years, as Hamas misrule is only slowly cleansed using very little sticks & punishment, but mostly slow positive carrots. Requiring individual moral agency by each Gazan
What if a nobody had the best proposal for peace, but no elites would listen to a nobody?
What can I say Robert? Beautifully written! I disagree with every syllable! Except for when you referenced Sharon as supporting Jordan is Palestinian, which it is, 75-85% of it, regardless of the Bedouin "king" that runs it. But even then, the Palestinians as they present themselves to this day are not interested in Jordan or the West Bank. They want Tel Aviv and Haifa and Jerusalem, and they never stop saying that openly and empathetically. It is too late for two states west of the Jordan river. There is Israel and there is Jordan. That's it.
Thanks Ehud. I appreciate both the compliment and the criticism--exactly the sort of conversation I'm looking for. My piece specifically brushes off the notion of near-term friendship and speaks only of a "cold peace," enforced by cooler heads outside of any future Palestine. Much of what you say is true, but Israel faces facts on the ground, as always. "Palestinian-movers" will be no more successful than "Jew-Movers"--and the rest of the world would impose a terrible price on Israel for any such attempt. Jordan has made clear for 56 years that they have no intention of resuming control over the West Bank, and Egypt has similarly refused all pleas for it to resume control over Gaza. Yes, Palestinians want Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa, but I'm not sure they want them any more than Assad wants them. The difference is that if Assad attempts to act upon his desires, or if he allows terrorists in his territory to do so, he is subject to heavy bombardment by the Israeli Army and Air Force. I'll also note that Egypt and Jordan were once as irredentist with respect to Israeli territory as the Palestinians are today. Now, they are at least civil toward Israel, and that change did not come from introspection, but rather from the certainty that Israeli had the right and the power to pulverize them if they acted badly. Those options are open to Israel if dealing with a state, but they're not possible with the status quo. My thesis is based not on optimism per se, but rather on steely pessimism--seeking a potentially less awful situation than the status quo. Again, I deeply appreciate your comments.
Your thesis is consistent. It also commendably tries to map out a solution. I see what you mean about steely pessimism, and it is apparent in your effort here, but at the same time I think that the over-all picture that you are painting is wildly optimistic and unachievable. And undesirable for the Jewish state. This thesis deserves a serious response. I need more time to digest this. Suggestion: would you be interested in a substack-based correspondence on this piece? Meaning I would write a post in response to this one of yours and we take it from there to see where it goes. At a leisurely pace so as not to interfere with our regular schedules. Or we could just continue the conversation here in the comments. What do you think?
Thanks, Ehud. If you write a piece, I will surely respond with humility and appreciation.
Appreciated! See you soon!
“A cold peace” is exactly what there was on October 6th. Which explains what is wrong with it.
I don't disagree. But a cold peace with Hamas dead and Saudi Arabia holding Palestinians' feet to the fire might be a very different cold peace. When Jordan ruled the West Bank and Egypt ruled Gaza, they had no external threat to inspire good behavior. Nor did Egypt or Jordan have the financial wherewithal to bribe/threaten the Palestinians into good behavior, even if they had wished to. I am hoping (not predicting) that fear of Iran and the precedents already laid down by the UAE and Bahrain (and to a lesser extent by Oman) might encourage Saudi Arabia to impose a Pax Saudia upon the recalcitrant Palestinians. Again, a hope, not a prediction. Particularly if Israel greatly reduces the economic ties with the West Bank that have long given Abbas the capacity to tolerate or provoke trouble. Again, a hope, not a prediction. And, again, not an ideal situation--merely the best of a bad lot of choices.
The Israelis would be insane to depend for their security on “Saudi Arabia holding Palestinians’ feet to the fire.”
FWIW, I'm enjoying your many contributions immensely. Your skepticism is logical, and well-stated. Given that, where do you imagine things will go in the next 20 years with respect to the conflict? Any resolution that you can imagine? Continued status quo?
I expect no big changes in the character of regimes or peoples. In science, and I think in life, the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, properly understood.
Does that mean no hope for peace in the Middle East? Not quite. If Israel is permitted to win the war, afterwards the Netanyahu project may resume and succeed: to normalize relations with the Arab nations and thereby essentially end the Arab-Israeli Wars. That would leave the Palestinian terrorist groups stranded like those Japanese soldiers on far-flung Pacific islands who didn’t know the war was over.
Does that mean a chance for peace in the Middle East? No, only for a less unfavorable posture when Iran brings war.
I’m not so sure they want Tel Aviv and Haifa and Jerusalem. Look how those were neglected before the Jews arrived! No, what they appear to want is to kill all the Jews.
Correction: before the Jews arrived in large numbers in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Of course there were already some Jews from time immemorial.
I think you are correct. But I think Robert has a point when he is talking about "moving Jews." Theoretically, if all the Jews were "removed" from Israel, the Arabs would be content. Nothing less than that though.
Hamas would still not be content.
Perhaps so, but in the event that all the Jews were “removed” from Israel, it is very possible that not only Hamas but the Palestinian Arab people would be liquidated, very much as the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) was after the North Vietnamese victory—and for the same reasons.
That’s quite a fetching conjecture. Really interesting, too.
TelAviv didn't exist before the Jews.
The Arabs did not even bother to found it.
Well it was Sand Dunes
Not entirely. (Later edit: possible confusion of pronoun’s antecedent. Tel Aviv was sand dunes; Zion as a whole was not entirely that.) And the Jewish pioneers were able to make something of it. In fact, it’s the greatest success story in the Third World.
First Israel is not the third world. Second there are photos of early Zionists literally standing on the sand dunes that would become TelAviv.
Yes. It was an architectural and urban planning masterpiece of the Bauhaus School.
I beg your pardon. I dispute not only the existence, but the possibility, of an architectural masterpiece of the Bauhaus School, for reasons substantially set out in Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House (1981).
Yeah ... I love that book, and I generally agree with Wolfe's thesis. But one can have an unpleasant masterpiece. My wife, son, and I always thought that Frank Lloyd Wright's houses were quite stunning, and we visited many of them across the country. With one exception, however, we thought they were all unlivable. Claustrophobic, inflexible layouts, materials that fell apart over time. But as works of art, they were quite beautiful--Fallingwater being the preeminent example of a masterpiece of imagery, but an awful interior space for living. Tel Aviv is something like that. Sort of the glimmering futuristic-looking city out of sci-fi. Of course, seeing it as I did, 60-70 years after it was built, the concrete surfaces were chipped and mildewed.
Correct. It's often forgotten that Faisal, King of Greater Syria after WWI, was sort of OK with the Balfour Declaration, made some moves toward welcoming Jews to Palestine as a way of spurring its pathetic economy, and signed an agreement with Chaim Weizmann--later the first president of Israel. There's longstanding debate over whether Faisal was sincere in signing the agreement or whether it was a subterfuge to give him leverage against the European mandatory authorities. But initially, he gave the appearance of welcoming the immigration of Jews to Palestine. Similarly, King Abdullah I of Jordan was initially open to a Jewish political entity in Palestine, though he seems to have insisted that it be a protectorate of Jordan, rather than an independent Jewish state. Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951, in part because he was secretly meeting with Israeli officials about potential agreements. His assassin was related to the Grand Mufti, of course.
Maybe a power struggle with the Mufti of Jerusalem. A good point, I think, but academic now.
I have to agree with Ehud Neor's comment here. 10/7 proved pretty emphatically that the "Palestinians" cannot be appeased. Their leaders have said publicly, multiple times since then, that 10/7 was only a rehearsal. *Take them at their word!*
You call Sharon's withdrawal a "Nixon-to-China" moment. This seems apt: a leader doing something no one expected, that everyone around him had good reason to oppose, which years later proved to be an utter disaster that should never have happened. This wasn't needed to demonstrate that appeasement of an armed, hostile adversary is a bad idea; we have millennia of human history to prove that beyond any reasonable doubt.
And that is called paying the Dane-geld;
but we've proved it again and again,
that if once you have paid him the Dane-geld
you never get rid of the Dane.
Thanks, Bob. I appreciate your comments and respect your logic. See what I've said to Ehud. As I noted at the start of my piece, I'm asking a question, not providing any definitive answer. I have no delusions about good intentions on the part of Abbas or his cohort. The status quo has festered for 56 years--without improvement--and I feel quite confident that it cannot fester another 56 years. (If I'm wrong, I will do my best to issue an erratum in 2079.) The question I ask is which institutional structure is least awful. I offer these thoughts with humility and understanding that there are good arguments to the contrary. But I think the conversation is worth having, as I am not optimistic about the current dynamic. As for Sharon, I suspect his action could have worked, but the post-Sharon policies obliterated the logic. The heavy cross-border traffic and provision of utilities may have been the real Dane-geld--and I wonder how different things might have been had Israel said, "You want us out? We're out. Go build some power plants. Build some water treatment facilities. Build some industries. Raise some crops. Good luck."
Yeah, sometimes I wonder if societal quarantine isn't the best (or at least the least-bad) solution. Wall them off, no one in or out by land, air, or sea, for any reason. No, not even that reason. Or that one. Check back in on them once every 50 years or so to see if they've learned to behave like a civilized society yet. No? OK. See you in another half-century. Bye.
I wouldn't advocate that, but I suspect you're being deliberately hyperbolic. Had the Gazans daily meals, clothes, water, healthcare, and electricity depended upon their own efforts, rather than Israel's largesse, I'm not sure Hamas's reign would have been sustainable for 17 years. The biggest potential hole in my conjecture is that the UN and NGOs might have plied them with enough aid to keep Hamas's racket going.
> I suspect you're being deliberately hyperbolic.
To a certain degree, yes.
> Had the Gazans daily meals, clothes, water, healthcare, and electricity depended upon their own efforts, rather than Israel's largesse, I'm not sure Hamas's reign would have been sustainable for 17 years. The biggest potential hole in my conjecture is that the UN and NGOs might have plied them with enough aid to keep Hamas's racket going.
Exactly. When the Israelis were able to grow prosperous on that land, with no outside help, it proves that it is possible. If other people are unable to do the same... there are really only so many viable explanations. Take away the excuses, and what's left is the truth, undeniable as a naked Emperor, plan for all to see whether they wish to acknowledge it or not.
And were anyone were to try what my essay suggests, an economic divorce without alimony) might well be an essential element. Again, I mentioned that the Saudis would have to wield carrots and sticks.
My modest two cents since October 8 have been what you advocate: all supplies of everything from Israel stop forever. Need food? Grow or trade for it like the rest of the world. No electricity? Need power? Buy fuel. etc. etc.
Yup! As I said to another writer, divorce, but no alimony. No infantilizing.
Israel, in its upcoming occupation, should be directing Gaza workers to do that, to build. A lot. Roads, power plants, water treatment and desalination, raising crops.
Very benign, very dictatorial.
Thank you for your post , Bob, and to all for the comments below.
And to you, as well. :)
I hesitate to weigh in on this as I lack the credentials and experience to do so except from a mental health perspective. I was raised Catholic by a devout mother and an equally devout Presbyterian father (who had to agree to the children being raised as Catholic or no marriage) then boarding schooled at an Episcopal school for 4 years. I found hypocrisy, racism, sexism and intolerance in all of them. My son in law, my best friends from medical school and residency, my bridge partner and my friend, the author of this outstanding blog, are Jewish and I only say this to observe that the only differences I see in people relate to the things they are taught at an early age. It’s hard to shake off the fervent dogma that is imposed upon us when we are unable to exercise reason or judgment and it doesn’t get any easier as we age and tread on the path that was set for us. I wish that “process” was taught before “content. Even if an elderly man was wise enough to have a change of mind and/or heart, I’m afraid it would take more courage than either of these two have to bring about the sensible and entirely logical circumstances you describe. However, I admire your
Sorry, I was editing and sent before finishing. My final thoughts: I wish that children were taught process before content, or, how to believe before what to believe, but it does no good to whine about it now. My premise is that I am more optimistic that younger players will be more able to alter the dynamics because they haven’t tread the path as far as the current leaders. I wish it were possible and that your bright ideas are present in the minds of those who have a seat at the table and that they have the ego strength to be wise when it conflicts with their identities. Thanks again for edifying and making me think deeply.
The problem isn’t one of leaders. If deprived of Hamas, the Gazans will find another just like it: because killing all the Jews is the most popular policy with that demographic.
… not as a means to, but instead of having a state of their own, which is what Westerners want them to want.
Thanks. There's a problem here, and it stems from what you yourself say ("It’s hard to shake off the fervent dogma that is imposed upon us when we are unable to exercise reason or judgment and it doesn’t get any easier as we age..."). All the children of Gaza--all of them--have been raised from birth in schools whose curriculum focuses on the beauty of killing Jews. Mundane arithmetic problems in their textbooks have the children count Jews killed, rather than apples and bananas. Those in charge offer great rewards for those who participate in the process of killing Jews. Israeli education is the antithesis--perhaps seen most stunningly in the Israeli medical system's heroic efforts to save the lives of injured Palestinian terrorists who have just murdered innocents on a bus or some such. But adults are capable of changing their minds. An upcoming column compares two histories--Hamas is an offshoot of an organization nurtured and financed by Nazi Germany with the express purpose of farming out the job of killing Jews in the Mideast. Hamas has made very clear since its establishment that that task is still central to its purpose and that there is essentially zero chance of their changing. My article will also describe another Hitler enthusiast who found a different path. That was Anwar Sadat--a great peacemaker who forged a genuine peace and friendship with the Israelis. He knew that path might cost him his life and, in the end, it did.
Anwar Sadat forged a genuine peace treaty with the Israelis. I am not persuaded that (beyond what was convenient to diplomacy) friendship entered into it. Nor need it have.
Of course it would be nice, but we Jews don’t need our neighbors to love us; we just need them not to attack us. In that respect we are like other people; but in other people this need is not considered outrageous.
The need is not limited to those in Israel, either.
The vast majority of commentators I've seen on this subject don't seem to have yet grasped that peace is dead in the Middle East. It's apparently too simple an insight for their sophisticated minds to consume.
History lessons, political analysis, blame game sermons, finger pointing victim claims etc all made a sort of sense when there was some hope they would lead to peace. If that hope is now gone, the kind of commentary that has dominated this subject for 75 years is now outdated, and no longer worth pursuing, as it's not going to accomplish anything.
The appropriate topic today is, how do we help the innocent get out of war zone?
Be very careful about suggesting that Israelis trust Fatah with their security. Why is Fatah not Hamas 2.0? Only because Abbas is old, rich, corrupt, and lazy. But—old!—he will soon be gone.
Indeed. I mention elsewhere that I don't trust Fatah one bit. I think there is a chance--and only a chance--that Saudi Arabia and certain other Arab nations may have both the power and the motive to rein in Fatah's worst impulses--a situation that did not exist previously. And it is not that I think an independent state run by Fatah would be good, but only that it might be less awful than the status quo.
As in Stalin might be less bad than Hitler? God spare us the choice.
Ah yes. But when the choice is there …
I don’t think it is or ever can be.
Not disagreeing. I just meant that the choice exists in theory. As a practical matter, I agree that some possibilities will never be feasible.
In theory, one option is that Israel can entrust her security to the friendly intervention of Neptunians.
Robert, you wrote a compelling and interesting thesis, but one I disagree with. First when Gaza was left to the Gazan’s in 2005 they were given the opportunity for independent governance by the PA. The first thing they did was destroy the infrastructure and businesses left for them, paid for by rich Americans. The next year Hamas was elected as their governing body. Hamas removed the PA with horrific violence. Why isn’t Hamas considered a State actor when they invade Israel? If they invaded Egypt they would be treated as a State actor. As for Abbas he is there because of the lesson learned in Gaza and there haven’t been any elections Judea and Samaria for the Arabs living there because Hamas would win. Given that some Arab terrorists are armed by Jordanian diplomats it isn’t hard to imagine more lethal weapons being transferred to the area west of the Jordan that originated in Iran. I think in the end your thesis fails because of Iran. Absent Iran there may be a way forward. Consider that the Houthi’s in Yemen are threatening free passage in the Red Sea after having fired on Saudi Arabia in the past all supported by Iran.
Some problems don’t have solutions. Not that are apparent at this time. As far as the treaty of Westphalia, that ended with NATO taking sides in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. The result is being felt in the Ukraine today.
Prior to 1993 the Arabs living in Judea and Samaria had the second highest standard of living in the Middle East, second only to the Saudis. The Oslo accords ended that because economics take second place to intifada. Maybe the end result of the latest round of fighting will yield new opportunities and new ideas. Until then the Israelis must prepare for war and pray for peace.
Thanks for the thoughtful query. Some mornings I agree with what you say, which is why I characterized my piece as more question than answer.
The key to my argument is that in our post-Westphalian world, statehood is well-defined and qualitatively different from any other institutional arrangement. I agree that the self-destruction and perpetual rain of missiles on Israel that followed the withdrawal from Gaza are appalling and deeply informative, they represent the behavior of nonstate actors, and not of a nation-state. After Israel’s departure, Gazans had “autonomous governance,” not “independent governance.” The Palestinians have observer status, not membership, at the United Nations. One reads about Palestinian “embassies” and “ambassadors,” rather than embassies and ambassadors—the quotation marks matter. Hamas lacks even this quasi-statal pretense. Hamas has, in fact, invaded Egyptian territory by tunnelling beneath it. Egypt responded by flooding tunnels, but their enemy was a shadowy consortium, not a government.
The query I pose here, is not whether this scheme would be good for Israel in the short- the medium-term, but, rather, whether it would be less awful for Israel than the alternatives. The alternatives I see are three: (1) Jordan, and/or Egypt resume control of the Palestinian territories; (2) Palestinians are relocated outside of Palestine; or (3) the status quo continues for additional decades. It has long been clear that neither (1) nor (2) is tenable, and the real heart of my query is whether October 7 can continue to be a viable option. My question is whether Palestinian independence, sired by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, and requiring mutual diplomatic recognition by Israel and Palestine is a less dangerous option going forward than (3).
As you suggest, Iran is the great unknown, but it may also be the glue that holds my whole idea together. Iran poses an existential threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, as well as to Israel. Arguably, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is distracting the Saudis and others from adequate response to the threats out of Yemen.
Right now, Israel monitors border controls, airspace, and sea access to the Palestinian territories. That is an enormous source of Palestinian resentment, but vital for Israel’s security, given the threat of Iranian weaponry coming in. For this reason, Israel is unlikely to agree to unsupervised Palestinian borders. I can, however, imagine Israel agreeing to turn that power over to a consortium of Arab nations which recognize Israel—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Sudan, UAE, and, presumably Saudi Arabia and others that sign on to a diplomatic resolution. Israel would not likely trust one nation (e.g., Jordan) because, as you suggest, that nation’s diplomats might facilitate the passage of Iranian weapons. But a multinational force might be acceptable, particular with a provision for Israeli observers.
Returning to the question of Westphalian nation-states, I’ll close with a cinematic reference. One aspect of the movie Casablanca always fascinated me. The entire premise of the film revolved around the idea that Nazi officials would respect letters of transit. The most barbaric regime in human history still felt obliged to respect the bureaucratic trappings of nationhood. And we have the actual cases of foreign diplomats like Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Carl Lutz, and Chiune Sugihara saving thousands of Jewish refugees by signing documents that the Nazis would not disrespect.
The question of my essay (question, not answer) is, in a post-October 7 world, which will be the more effective restraint on Palestinian behavior—the Israeli military or the ligatures borne by nation-states. I don’t pretend to know the answer, but I am confident that it is an open question.
I think the entire Oslo process was a a catastrophic mistake. Many argued at the time that any concessions made by Israel would be irreversable even if Arafat proved to be the terrorist/murderer he had always been. And so it proved to be. To this DAY, mandarins in our state department demand Israel allow a terror state on its border. There were alternatives. There were Palestinians who actually lived in the West Bank who might have been more interested in accepting a compromnise in return for a state but Rabin wanted Arafat who he stupidly thought would fight and destroy Hamas. We all know how that worked out. If Sharon knew that Hamas would be ruling Gaza in two years and making war on Israel for the next dozen he never would have done what he did. Once again an Israeli leader trusted the PLO to do what it never could or would do. Now we are here. From my standpoint the best thing Israel could actually do, since the US demands a solution, the rest of the world wants Israel to disappear in favor of a terror state and the PA has NO interest in accepting a state if it means ending the conflict to destroy Israel is as follows:
Israel should do what it WOULD do if the PA was actually interested in peace. Annex, those "settlements: (Which are actually cities) adjacent to Jerusalem where the vast majority of the "settlers" live. Annex any other land necessary for Israel's security on the assumption it will have a permanent bloodthirsty enemy on the border. Remove any settlements that fall outside this area. Declare a border and say negotiations are over. Any Palestinians on the Israeli side of the border can claim citizenship (After proper security vetting) by pledging loyalty to the state as Israel Arabs do. Any unwilling to do so can be placed on the other side of the border. Create a serious no mans land and declare that anyone entering it will be shot on sight. No Palestinian will be allowed to enter Israel ever. ALl borders will be shut tight. Declare that any hostile actions by the state of Palestine will bring major repurcussions. Declare any nation that arms Palestine or a terror group based in Palestine will be treated as having committed an act of war. Declare that Israel will refuse to cooperate with any international organization that seeks to aid Palestine in its war to destroy Israel. And then carry it out.
This is a terrible solution. But since the status quo is clearly no longer tenable it is the only thing that can be done when the Palestinians won't utilize diplomacy and act in good faith.
I think Bill Clinton came to a similar conclusion after Arafat stabbed him and Israel in the back. Yes, Rabin erred grievously in extending any trust whatsoever to Arafat. As for your second paragraph, with a few exceptions, it's not too different from what I suggested. Much of what you suggest is the natural order of things between two nations established under Westphalian Principles. As I've mentioned elsewhere, I would suggested that a treaty establishing independence specify that border control--including air and sea routes--would be overseen by a multinational outfit run by, say, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan (plus any later signatories to the Abraham Accords)--with Israeli observers. The Palestinians wouldn't like it, but it would considerably delegitimize the claim that occupation continues. Israel might be hesitant to entrust any one Arab nation with such a role, but the interests of those 7 countries are varied enough to make the idea worth considering.
The point is that the Palestinians will never sign anything that requires them to either end the conflict or make a single concession.
True so far, but that was also true of the Egyptians, Jordanians, etc. It depends on the incentives and facts on the ground. “Never” is a long time.
Big difference. Sadat and Hussein had strategic reasons for doing it. Their nations entire national identity was not built around the destruction of Israel. I wouldn't say never but as the Palestinian populace has been thoroughly Nazified it would take decades of de Nazification before it would be remotely possible. That's what Oslo was supposed to provide, a Palestinian population educated to accept compromise. The exact opposite happened because the leaders of the Palestinian national movement are not Anwar Sadat
Hence, my suggestion in the piece and in various comments that the guarantor would have to be not the Palestinians, but rather the Saudis, perhaps in concert with other Arab nations that have a strong strategic interest in reining in the Palestinians' ill intentions. Oslo presumed goodwill from the Palestinian Authority. I suggest a process that presumes goodwill from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others with the power to restrain the Palestinians. And, frankly, Egypt under Nasser was pretty close to today's Palestinians in terms of Nazification.
Egypt still is close in terms of Nazification. The difference is that Sadat made a strategic decision in 1973 to leave the Soviet orbit and enter the American and to do that he had to make his peace with Israel. It was never popular and led to his murder. It wasn't especially popular in Jordan either which is why the King frequently sounds like Abu Mazen. The only country that I see where there has been a real shift is the UAE.
I think they may. But they will simply ignore their “promises.” That has been their pattern.
They have never signed anything where they would be required to make a concrete concession of any kind. Three times they rejected it.
They have signed several ceasefire agreements and violated them all.
I was referring to peace agreements to settle the conflict pursuant to the terms of Oslo.
Well, okay then.
There will not be peace until Israel totally controls Gaza, with Hamas powerless tho preferably having surrendered.
Then Israel should declare a new state, tha Gaza Confederation (5 cantons), temporarily occupied by Israel and subject to Israeli martial law. NOT the PA corruption of West Bank, and instead the second of a 3 state solution.
Based on UN human rights, and on Swiss govt limits, with Singapore style enforcement of law, Israel can show the world how to create a new city state—while putting all Gazans to work on reconstruction. The 5 current Gaza admin districts should become cantons led by an Israeli, with a group of Gaza advisors.
Then Israel can remain Jewish, the West Bank remain PA controlled, and Gaza becomes an internationally open and secular society… full of Jew haters who must follow very humane laws and have jobs.
Maybe Gaza Palestine Confederation is a better, tho longer name.
Unfortunately, what you are discussing is fairly close to what existed 1967-2005. Gaza had one of the world's fastest-growing economies during those years. Literacy and other education metrics soared. Wasn't what they wanted.
Fairly close economically, but …
What country was it in?
My point is that Israel in victory over Hamas has the opportunity to declare the Gaza Confederation a separate country, separate from the West Bank.
Create a Swiss based constitution with changes, primarily those of Tel Aviv secular Jews wanting a non-Jewish legal system with no special Jewish, nor Muslim nor Christian nor atheist rights.
With honest occupation and martial law, NOT democracy, at first. Then each individual Gaza inhabitant becomes, automatically, a citizen of the Gaza Confederation. Then the Israeli occupiers take physical census of all 2.3 million, allowing ID and noting birthday & family info. And each adult signs an actual Social Contract, which includes Gaza & Israeli borders, and a promise to obey laws with a promise to renounce terrorism.
Never before tried, won’t work 100% for those who sign.
For those who don’t sign—they become Prisoners of War, and Gaza might have numerous POW camps. And allow UN & Red Cross visits. They will be freed when they surrender and sign up to be law abiding Gaza citizens.
Israeli police, judges, government supervisors with limited Gaza support of trusted locals.
Maybe a big bonus to Israeli Arabs willing to emigrate to Gaza, and keep dual citizenship & voting rights in Israel until Gaza elections start, in some future time.
During the prior pre-2005 occupation, Israel was trying to create a single second state, the 2 state solution, allowing lots of Jew hating Muslims veto powers. The Gaza Confederation is a 3 state solution. Jewish Israel, Muslim West Bank not yet a country with agreed to borders, and forced non-secular Gaza. Maybe not to be democratic for 16 years, as Hamas misrule is only slowly cleansed using very little sticks & punishment, but mostly slow positive carrots. Requiring individual moral agency by each Gazan
What if a nobody had the best proposal for peace, but no elites would listen to a nobody?